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Let me introduce you to Steven Pollack. Pollack is a resident of 
Highland Park, Illinois.1 He is also an environmentalist, who enjoys 
drinking clean water, eating uncontaminated fish and observing 
wildlife on the great lakes near his home.2 For a long time, the United 
States has operated a firing range next to the lake thirteen miles north 
of Highland Park.3 Over the years, errant bullets have escaped the 
confines of the range and entered Lake Michigan.4 These bullets break 
down over time and release lead into the lake, which is the source of 
drinking water for millions of people, including Pollack.5 Pollack 
decided that he would put an end to this polluting, and he filed suit 
against the government seeking an injunction and civil penalties for 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. I would like to thank Prof. Hal Morris, Paul Forster, and Sarah Kaplan 
for their invaluable help and encouragement. 
1 Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 577 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010). 
2 Id. 
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alleged violations of the Clean Water Act.6 In Pollack’s case, the 
United States government admitted to dumping tons of lead into the 
water, but it took the position that there was nothing Pollack could do 
about it because he was neither sufficiently exposed to the toxic 
chemicals leaching into Lake Michigan, nor had he concretely or 
specifically described his leisure time pursuits to show that they were 
harmed by the lead.7 Pollack’s claims were dismissed for want of 
standing before his suit even began.8 
Standing is easy to describe but difficult to apply. At a minimum, 
standing requires three elements: (1) injury-in-fact; (2) traceability to 
conduct of the defendant; and (3) that a favorable decision could 
provide redress for the injury.9 Environmental cases offer a unique 
challenge because the harms are generally to nature, not the individual. 
Courts agree that an aesthetic injury, such as the death of a few trees, 
constitutes an injury; however, the question remains: who is injured? 
At common law, many of these aesthetic injuries were not 
sufficient to support a claim. However, over time, Congress has 
pronounced these injuries to be important. Congress has the power to 
create and quantify “new” injuries, as well as address the mechanism 
for causation of those injuries. In most environmental cases, Congress 
has used this power to provide statutes to exactly describe these 
injuries, like the Clean Water Act or the Endangered Species Act. At 
the same time, the courts have attempted to maintain their 
independence by leaving the greater environmental policy to the 
legislature and the executive and refusing to hear any complaint that 
does not present a case or controversy.10 In environmental litigation, a 
plaintiff can only allege his subjective loss of these new rights. Often, 
a plaintiff must prove that he enjoys seeing or feeling these natural 
wonders and that his injury comes from the damage that those 
                                                 
6 Id. 
7 See id. 
8 Id. at 743. 
9 Id. at 739 (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1148 
(2009)). 
10 See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
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wonders will suffer.11 Concededly, this is a standard where the injury 
rests solely on the personal preferences of the plaintiff.  
In its current form, the standing doctrine allows judges to apply 
their own standards and decide who gets into court.12 Where the court 
wishes to preclude a case, it may require strict proof of the elements 
supporting standing; in many cases, it effectively requires the plaintiff 
to prove its case at the pleading stage. Other courts have applied a 
more lenient, sliding standard, demanding more proof as the case 
proceeds through each successive procedural step.13 This approach 
requires such a minimal showing that it allows almost anyone to 
survive a motion to dismiss. This Note proposes that the strict standard 
be used where there is only a procedural injury, but that a sliding scale 
be used where there may be an independent basis for standing.  
The next section of this Note outlines the development of the 
standing doctrine from Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife14 through 
Summers v. Earth Island Institute15 and examines how several courts 
have applied this standard to their cases. Section II provides a 
statement of the case for Pollack v. Department of Justice. Section III 
provides an analysis of the difficulty of applying the standing doctrine 
and proposes an approach that demands more than pleadings, but 
removes the court’s license to pre-litigate the merits of the case under 




Standing is a judicially created doctrine that operates to limit the 
types of cases that the court may hear. Courts use it to protect the 
validity of the adversarial process by determining whether there is an 
actual controversy and whether each side can be adequately 
                                                 
11 See generally Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009). 
12 See, e.g., Pollack, 577 F.3d at 741.   
13 See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 588 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
14 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
15 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009). 
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represented.16 The requirements for standing are not found in the 
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, which limits 
the courts to hearing cases or controversies,17 but rather find their 
genesis with Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter.18 Today, Justice Scalia 
is considered the expert on the issue of standing. However, as argued 
later in this Note, Justice Kennedy, who rarely writes for the Court, 
may have had a greater influence on standing doctrine through his 
additions and clarifications to the majority opinion.19 
Standing has three fundamental elements: 
 
[A] plaintiff must show that he is under threat of suffering 
“injury in fact” that is concrete and particularized; the threat 
must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; 
it must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the 
defendant; and it must be likely that a favorable judicial 
decision will prevent or redress the injury.20 
 
The landmark decision addressing environmental standing is 
Sierra Club v. Morton, in which the Supreme Court recognized that 
plaintiffs may bring an action based purely on aesthetic harms.21 Next, 
in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures, the high water mark of environmental standing, the Court 
found that a group of students had standing to challenge the Interstate 
Commerce Commission’s rates, which made it less expensive to ship 
                                                 
16 See Pollack, 577 F.3d at 738. 
17 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
18 Kelly D. Spragins, Note, Rekindling an Old Flame: The Supreme Court 
Revives Its “Love Affair with Environmental Litigation” in Friends of the Earth v. 
Laidlaw Environmental Services, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 955, 968 (2000). The doctrine of 
standing was developed to prevent activist judges from declaring New Deal 
legislation unconstitutional. Id. 
19 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1148 (2009).  
20 Pollack, 577 F.3d at 739 (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S.Ct. 
1142, 1149 (2009)). 
21 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972).  
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new metal than scrap metal.22 The Court held that the students 
demonstrated an injury by showing that they used the forests, streams, 
mountains, and other resources for outdoor recreation, and that the 
new rates would make it more expensive to recycle, leading to more 
litter in these areas.23 
 
A. Standing in the Supreme Court  
 
1. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 
 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife marked the beginning of the 
modern approach to standing in environmental cases.24 In Lujan, 
several environmental groups brought an action challenging a 
regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior that required 
other agencies to engage in a consultation with the Secretary under the 
Endangered Species Act, but only when a federal project occurred 
within the United States or at sea.25 The Endangered Species Act 
sought to protect listed species of animals against threats to their 
continued existence that are directly attributable to the actions of 
humans.26 Therefore, every federal agency must engage in a 
consultation with the Secretary of the Interior and ensure that any 
activity it authorizes, funds, or carries out will not jeopardize the 
continued survival of an endangered species.27 Originally, the 
Secretary’s expert agencies, the Fish and Wildlife Service and the 
National Marine Fisheries Service, promulgated regulations extending 
this duty to projects occurring on foreign soil.28 However, in 1986, 
these agencies promulgated new regulations, which removed the 
requirement for consultation when an activity was conducted on 
                                                 
22 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973). 
23 Id. 
24 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
25 Id. at 558–59. 
26 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531–1544 (1988). 
27 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
28 Id.  
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foreign soil.29 Thereafter, the plaintiffs, organizations dedicated to the 
protection of wildlife, filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment 
that the new regulation was in error, as well as an injunction forcing 
the Secretary to promulgate new regulations extending the duty to 
engage in a consultation to activities occurring on foreign soil.30 
 At the outset, the Secretary challenged the plaintiffs’ standing 
to bring this suit, and the district court, agreeing, dismissed the suit for 
lack of standing.31 On appeal, however, the Eighth Circuit reversed, 
finding that the plaintiffs had standing.32 After remand, the district 
court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and ordered 
the Secretary to promulgate new regulations.33 The Eighth Circuit 
affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiffs.34 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and addressed the Secretary’s standing arguments.35 
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority, holding that the plaintiffs 
lacked standing to challenge the Secretary’s regulations.36 He stated: 
 
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible 
constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements: 
. . . [f]irst, . . . an ‘injury in fact’37 . . . [s]econd, . . . a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained 
                                                 
29 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559.  
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 557, 562. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice 
White, Justice Thomas, Justice Souter, and Justice Kennedy, who wrote a 
concurrence joined by Justice Souter on the issue of redressibility.  Justice Stevens 
filed a separate concurrence and concurrence in judgment. Finally, Justice Blackmun 
and Justice O’Connor dissented. 
37 Id. at 560 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984)). 
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of38 . . . [and t]hird, it must be likely . . . that the injury will 
be redressed by a favorable decision.”39  
e 
 true.  
                                                
 
The party invoking the federal jurisdiction has the burden of satisfying 
these elements, and since they are not merely pleading requirements, 
“each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter 
on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner 
and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of 
litigation.”40 At the pleadings stage, general factual allegations of 
injury may suffice because the court should “presume that general 
allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support 
the claim.”41 However, in response to a motion for summary 
judgment, the general allegations will no longer be sufficient, and th
plaintiff will be required to set forth specific facts, which should be 
taken as 42
Where the government directly regulates an individual, standing is 
ordinarily found.43 The problem arises when a plaintiff claims injury 
by government regulation of someone else.44 In these cases, standing 
hinges on the actions of the regulated third party and the unrestricted 
actions of the plaintiff; therefore, the court will require the plaintiff to 
“adduce facts showing that those choices have been made or will be 
made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressibility 
of injury.”45 
In Lujan, the plaintiffs alleged that the Secretary’s failure to 
consult before funding a project in Sri Lanka would increase the rate 
 
38 Id. (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)). 
39 Id. at 560–61 (internal quotations omitted). 
40 Id. at 561 (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883–89 
(1990)). 
41 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 561–62. 
44 Id. at 562. 
45 Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975)).  
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of extinction of endangered species by destroying critical habitat.46 
However, according to the Court, although the general desire to 
observe endangered species, even for purely aesthetic reasons, is a 
cognizable interest, the plaintiffs must demonstrate how they will be 
among those injured by the action.47 One of the plaintiffs asserted that 
she had visited the site of the proposed project and had intended to 
observe endangered species, including the Asian elephant and leopard; 
that the proposed project would damage the habitat of those species; 
and that she had been injured because she “intends to return to Sri 
Lanka in the future and hopes to be more fortunate in spotting at least 
the endangered elephant and leopard.”48 However, the difficulty of 
returning to Sri Lanka became apparent when the plaintiffs were 
deposed.49 Another plaintiff could not clarify when she wished to 
return to Sri Lanka: “I don’t know [when]. There is a civil war going 
on right now. I don’t know. Not next year, I will say. In the future.”50 
Justice Scalia found that these “some day” intentions to return to Sri 
Lanka—“without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even 
any specification of when the some day will be—do not support a 
finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.”51  
The ecosystem nexus theory, argued by the plaintiffs, where 
damage in one part of an ecosystem will result in damage to the whole, 
was also dismissed by Justice Scalia. According to the Justice, “a 
plaintiff claiming injury from environmental damage must use the area 
affected by the challenged activity and not an area roughly ‘in the 
vicinity’ of it.”52 At the summary judgment stage, a factual showing of 
perceptible harm is required.53 
                                                 
46 Id. at 562.  
47 Id. at 563.  
48 Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
49 Id. at 563–64. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 564. 
52 Id. at 565–66. 
53 Id. at 566. 
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In addition, Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality54, found that 
the injury was not redressible because the agency being sued was not 
the agency funding the project; it was merely required to provide 
information to the agency that was supplying the funding.55 
Furthermore, the amount of funding provided by the agency was a 
small fraction of the total funding for the project.56 Therefore, Justice 
Scalia found that even if the plaintiffs prevailed, any relief granted was 
unlikely to have an impact on whether the project was built.57 
Finally, Justice Scalia addressed the plaintiffs’ claim to a 
“procedural injury” stemming from the right to comment on the 
proposed funding of the Sri Lankan project.58 Under the citizen suit 
provision of the Endangered Species Act, “any person may commence 
a civil suit on his own behalf . . . to enjoin any person, including the 
United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency 
. . . who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this 
chapter.”59 The lower court had held that this provision allowed 
anyone to sue when the consultation requirement was violated.60 
Justice Scalia, however, found the plaintiffs’ claims to be a generaliz





                                                
61 Just
Scalia analogized this approach to that in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 
where the Court held that an individual taxpayer did not have st
to challenge federal expenditures because the plaintiff only suffered a
indefinite injury, which was shared with all taxpayers.62 Additionally, 
allowing the suit would impermissibly intrude on the executive 
 
54 Id. at 570 (plurality) (this portion was joined only by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, Justice White and Justice Thomas). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 571. 
57 Id.  
58 Id. at 571–72.  
59 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988).  
60 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572. 
61 Id. at 572–73. 
62 Id. at 574 (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)). 
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branch.63 According to Justice Scalia, protecting the public interest is 
the duty of Congress and the President.64 Therefore, a procedural 
right, such as the right to comment or to require information gathering,
will not give rise to standing without a particularized injury 65
 
.  
                                                
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter, 
agreed with the essential portions of the majority, but wrote to clarify 
two main points.66 First, Justice Kennedy discussed the importance of 
requiring the plaintiffs in this case to announce a “date certain” for 
their return to Sri Lanka.67 The reason that the Court required more 
concrete plans is because in this case, it is not “reasonable to assume 
that the affiants will be using the sites on a regular basis.”68 However, 
Justice Kennedy was unwilling to completely foreclose any of the 
environmental nexus theories, which may give rise to standing under 
the right set of facts.69 Under these facts, Justice Kennedy agreed that 
the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a concrete injury sufficient to 
support standing.70 
Second, as government becomes more complex and far-reaching, 
the Court must “be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action 
that do not have clear analogs in our common-law tradition.”71 
Congress has the power to define new injuries and describe the chain 
of causation that can give rise to these injuries.72 While not the case in 
Lujan, a newly recognized injury could give rise to standing. 
 
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 576.  
65 Id. at 578.  
66 Id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
67 Id. 
68 Id.  
69 Id. (citing Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 231 
n.4 (1986)).  
70 Id. at 580.  
71 Id. (“Modern litigation has progressed far from the paradigm of Marbury 
suing Madison to get his commission, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), or 
Ogden seeking an injunction to halt Gibbons’ steamboat operations, Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).”).  
72 Id.  
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By contrast, Justice Stevens’ concurrence reads more like a 
dissent.73 Justice Stevens would find standing in this case, but would 
affirm on the merits, holding that the Endangered Species Act does not 
apply to actions taken in other countries.74 He wrote, “[i]n my opinion 
a person who has visited the critical habitat of an endangered species 
has a professional interest in preserving the species and its habitat, and 
intends to revisit them in the future has standing to challenge agency 
action that threatens their destruction.”75 Justice Stevens argues that 
the plaintiffs should have standing based on their interest in observing 
wildlife since Congress has found value in protecting endangered 
species.76 In Justice Stevens’ view, the injury is measured by the 
environmental harm, rather than the ability of the plaintiffs to 
expeditiously visit the affected area.77 
Noting that the Court has found standing to be lacking where the 
environmental harm is speculative, Justice Stevens found that under 
these facts, the harm to the environment was practically certain.78 
Citing the dissent, Justice Stevens believed that the plaintiffs have at 
least created a question of fact: “a reasonable finder of fact could 
conclude, from their past visits, their professional backgrounds, and 
their affidavits and deposition testimony, that [plaintiffs] will return to 
the project sites and, consequently, will be injured by the destruction 
of the endangered species and critical habitat.”79 Further, Justice 
Stevens argues that requiring consultation is itself redress for the 
alleged injury: “[I]f Congress required consultation between agencies, 
we must presume that such consultation will have a serious purpose 
that is likely to produce tangible results.”80 
                                                 
73 See id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
74 Id. at 582, 590. 
75 Id. at 582.  
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 583.  
78 Id. (distinguishing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158–159 (1990)).  
79 Id. at 584. 
80 Id. at 585. 
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Justice Blackmun dissented and found that the majority sought to 
impose “fresh limitations” on the constitutional authority of Congress 
to allow citizen suits for procedural injuries.81 His dissent focused on 
identifying the appropriate standard for reviewing a motion for 
summary judgment.82 In order to survive a motion for summary 
judgment, a plaintiff only needs to show that there is a genuine issue 
of material fact.83 According to Justice Blackmun, the Court’s 
“function is not [it]self to weigh the evidence and determine the truth 
of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for 
trial.”84 The majority never mentions this standard.85 Accordingly, the 
majority requires a standard that is too high.86 If the Court applied the 
“proper standard,” Justice Blackmun argues that it would conclude 
that the plaintiffs have advanced sufficient facts to create a genuine 
issue for trial concerning whether one or both plaintiffs would be 
injured.87  
In Justice Blackmun’s view, requiring a “description of concrete 
plans” or “specification of when the some day [for a return visit] will 
be” ends up being a mere formality because nothing prevents plaintiffs 
from purchasing plane tickets.88 Additionally, Justice Blackmun takes 
issue with the majority’s disregard for the potential for nexus harms.89 
While in some cases, a plaintiff must be in close proximity to the 
damage to be affected—for example, a person claiming aesthetic 
damages from mining activities must be close enough to see the ruined 
                                                 
81 Id. at 589–90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
82 Id. at 590. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 591.  
88 Id. at 592. Justice Blackmun worries that this requirement will revive 
formalistic code-pleading, in the worst case requiring that “a Federal Tort Claims 
Act plaintiff alleging loss of consortium . . . furnish this Court with a ‘description of 
concrete plans’ for her nightly schedule of attempted activities.” Id. 
89 Id. at 594. 
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landscape—in many cases, an environmental harm in one area may 
spread to other areas, giving rise to everyone in its wake.90 
 
2. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw  
 
Standing was once again the central issue in Friends of the Earth, 
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services.91 In Laidlaw, plaintiff 
environmental groups sued under the citizen suit provisions of the 
Clean Water Act, alleging a violation of the defendant’s permitted 
mercury discharge limits.92 The plaintiffs sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief, as well as civil penalties.93 In Laidlaw, the defendant 
purchased an incineration facility in South Carolina and promptly 
secured a permit allowing the facility to discharge a limited amount of 
effluent into the North Tyger River.94 The defendant exceeded its 
permit limits on several chemicals, including mercury.95 However, the 
defendant convinced the state to file an enforcement action against it, 
and it agreed to pay a limited civil penalty and “to make every effort to 
comply with its permit obligations.”96 The plaintiffs also filed suit 
under the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water Act.97 The 
defendant moved to dismiss the action based on the settlement with 
the state, but the district court held that the state had not diligently 
                                                 
90 Id. (citing Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221 
(1986) (harm to American whale watchers from Japanese whaling activities) and 
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992) (harm to Oklahoma residents from 
wastewater treatment plant located thirty-nine miles from the border)). 
91 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 
(2000). Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, Justice O’Connor, Justice Kennedy, Justice 
Souter, and Justice Breyer. Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy each filed 
concurrences, and Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented. Id. at 171. 
92 Id. at 173, 176.  
93 Id. at 177. 
94 Id. at 175–76.  
95 Id. at 176.  
96 Id. at 176–77 (internal quotations omitted).  
97 Id. at 177. 
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prosecuted the violations; therefore, the court allowed the plaintiffs’ 
citizen suit.98 During the litigation, the defendant ceased all of its 
continuing violations.99 Two years later, the district court instituted a 
civil penalty against the facility, but it did not grant an injunction 
because the permit violations had ceased.100 The plaintiffs appealed 
the size of the civil penalty, and the defendant argued on appeal that 
the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit.101 The Fourth Circuit 
assumed, without deciding, that the plaintiffs had standing, but held 
that the case became moot because institution of civil penalties 
payable to the federal government would not redress the plaintiffs’ 
injuries.102 
The statutory foundation for this suit is the Clean Water Act’s 
citizen suit provision.103 Under the Clean Water Act, a discharger must 
secure a permit under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES), which imposes strict limits on the amount of 
pollutant that can be discharged.104 Discharge of a pollutant in excess 
of a facility’s permit limit constitutes a violation of the Act.105 Under 
§ 505 of the Act, citizens may bring suit to enforce any limitation in an 
NPDES permit.106 “Citizen” is defined as “a person or persons having 
an interest which is or may be adversely affected.”107 Prior to filing a 
complaint, the plaintiff must send a sixty-day notice of intent to sue to 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and to the alleged 
violator, in order to allow sixty days for the EPA to intervene and give 
the violator enough time to comply with its permit.108 The Supreme 
                                                 
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 179. 
100 Id. at 178. 
101 Id. at 179. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 173. 
104 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994). 
105 33 U.S.C. § 1342(h). 
106 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). 
107 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (g). 
108 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (b)(1)(A).  
 422
14
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 5
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss2/5
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 5, Issue 2                         Spring 2010 
 
Court has held that a plaintiff lacks standing to sue if a defendant, after 
receiving a notice from a citizen plaintiff, ceases its alleged violation 
by the time the plaintiff files its complaint.109 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, held that the plaintiffs 
had demonstrated that the case was not moot because permit 
compliance after a suit is filed does not moot an action for civil 
penalties.110 However, the Court first needed to determine whether the 
plaintiffs had standing at the beginning of the case.111 The defendants 
first claimed that there could be no injury in fact because the district 
court concluded that there was “no demonstrated proof of harm to the 
environment.”112 The Court held, however, that the relevant showing 
for Article III purposes was not the injury to the environment, but the 
injury to the plaintiff.113 In this case, one of the plaintiffs alleged that 
he lived a half-mile from the facility; that he occasionally drove over 
the river and it smelled polluted; that he would like to fish, camp, 
swim and picnic near the river (between three and fifteen miles 
downstream of the facility), as he did when he was a teenager, but 
would not do so because he was concerned that the water was polluted 
by the defendant’s discharges.114 The Court found that the plaintiffs 
had standing because these individuals averred that the “aesthetic and 
recreational values of the area will be lessened” by the alleged 
discharges.115 Although these harms were subjective, they were 
reasonable fears that prevented the plaintiffs from full use and 
enjoyment of the river.116 Finally, the Court held that the imposition of 
civil penalties provided a deterrent effect on potential future 
                                                 
109 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 
167, 174 (2000) (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 
U.S. 49, 60 (1987)). 
110 Id. at 180.  
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 181. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 181–82. Other members of the plaintiff organization made similar 
allegations. Id. 
115 Id. at 183. 
116 Id. at 184. 
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discharges, which was sufficient to support the standing element of 
redressibility of the alleged injury.117  
Both Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, and Justice Scalia, in 
his dissent, raised the issue of whether a citizen suit provision was an 
unconstitutional delegation of power by the legislature; however, 
neither Justice found Laidlaw to be an appropriate case to address that 
issue.118  
Justice Scalia’s argument in dissent boils down to a conclusion 
that there cannot be an injury to a person if there has been no injury to 
the environment.119 He found that the “concern” that the plaintiffs 
exhibited is “woefully short on ‘specific facts,’ and the vague 
allegations of injury they do make are undermined by the evidence 
adduced at trial.”120 This argument is based on the fact that the district 
court concluded that there was no demonstrable harm to the 
environment and that the permit violations did not result in a risk to 
human health.121 The district court’s finding is based on the fact that 
the water quality levels in the river are better than the limits placed for 
the safety of water bodies that support recreation in and on the 
water.122 
Justice Scalia would require the plaintiffs to make some 
evidentiary showing that their alleged harms were, in fact, 
occurring.123 He argued that the plaintiffs made nothing more than 
conclusory allegations in their affidavits.124 And, as a matter of public 
policy, he believes that the standard endorsed by the majority allows 
too many people to assert standing.125 
 
                                                 
117 Id. at 187. 
118 Id. at 197 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 209–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
119 Id. at 198–99.  
120 Id.  
121 Id. at 199.  
122 Id.  
123 Id. at 200.  
124 Id. at 201.  
125 Id.  
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3. Summers v. Earth Island Institute 
 
Most recently, the Court narrowed standing in Summers v. Earth 
Island Institute.126 In Summers, the plaintiff environmental 
organizations challenged regulations promulgated by the United States 
Forest Service, which exempted salvage timber sales of less than 250 
acres from the notice and comment provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).127 NEPA requires that the federal 
agency acting as the project proponent engage in an analysis of the 
potential environmental impacts of its proposed project and evaluate 
the feasibility of potential alternatives.128  
In the summer of 2002, fire burned a significant area within the 
Sequoia National Forest, which included the Burnt Ridge area.129 
After the fire, the Forest Service approved the salvage sale on 238 
acres of the forest without requiring notice or comment.130 In 
response, the plaintiffs filed their complaint alleging that the Forest 
Service failed to follow its own NEPA regulations in approving the 
sale.131 The district court granted a preliminary injunction relating 




                                                
132 The parties settled their disput
with regard to one of the parcels, after which the Forest Service a
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain their action.133 The 
district court found for the plaintiffs and invalidated the regulations at 
issue.134 The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing, 
 
126 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).  
127 Id. at 1147.  
128 Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform Act (Appeals Reform 
Act), Pub. L. No. 102-381, tit. III, § 322, 106 Stat. 1419 (note following 16 U.S.C. § 
1612.). 
129 Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1147.  
130 Id.  
131 Id. at 1148.  
132 Id.  
133 Id.  
134 Id.  
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except for the regulations applying to the Burnt Ridge project, an
upheld the nationwide injunction on two of the five regu
d 
lations.135 
                                                
Justice Scalia, back in control of the majority, focused on the 
affidavit of plaintiff Bensman in concluding that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing because the members of the plaintiff organization did not 
allege that they were impacted by a specific timber sale.136 According 
to Justice Scalia, “[i]t is a failure to allege that any particular timber 
sale or other project claimed to be unlawfully subject to the 
regulations will impede a specific and concrete plan of Bensman’s to 
enjoy the National Forests.”137 Bensman alleged only that he had 
visited many National Forests and planned to visit several unnamed 
National Forests in the future.138 While there may be a chance that 
Bensman’s travels in the National Forests will intersect with a parcel 
that is about to be affected by the regulations, “without further 
specification it is impossible to tell which projects are (in respondents’ 
view) unlawfully subject to the regulations.”139 Justice Scalia found 
that it was unlikely that Bensman’s trips would intersect a Forest 
Service timber sale.140 While the Bensman affidavit referred to several 
projects occurring in the National Forest, it did not show any firm 
intention to visit those locations.141 The vague desire to return for a 
some-day visit was insufficient to support standing.142  
Finally, the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert a procedural 
right.143 The majority held that “deprivation of a procedural right 
without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation—a 
 
135 Id.  
136 Id. at 1149–51.  
137 Id. at 1150 (emphasis in original).  
138 Id.  
139 Id. (emphasis in original). 
140 Id. (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983)). Justice Scalia found 
it would be less likely for Bensman to wander into a timber sale than it would be for 
Lyons to be put into a chokehold by police for a second time. Id.  
141 Id.  
142 Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992)). 
143 Id.  
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procedural right in vacuo—is insufficient to create Article III 
standing.”144 And, while a procedural right may lessen the causation 
and redressibility hurdles, a plaintiff must still demonstrate a concrete 
injury.145 Because there was no concrete injury to the plaintiffs in this 
case, they could not maintain standing for the procedural violation.146 
Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, stated, “[t]his case would 
present different considerations if Congress had sought to provide 
redress for a concrete injury ‘giv[ing] rise to a case or controversy 
where none existed before.’”147 
In dissent, Justice Breyer outlined a probabilistic approach to 
determining injury in fact.148 Justice Breyer argued that the sheer 
number of members in the plaintiff organizations meant that it is more 
likely than not that one or more of the members will be affected by the 
timber sales.149 Justice Breyer stated that this probability should 
satisfy the requirement of imminence.150 In other words, because the 




                                                
With regard to the procedural injury, Justice Breyer argued that 
the plaintiffs have standing because (1) members of the group have 
used affected parcels in the past and are likely to do so again in the 
future; and (2) the group’s members have opposed the Forest Service’s 
activities in the past using procedural methods and will likely use 
these methods in the future.152 He would find this sufficient to 
 
144 Id. at 1151.  
145 Id.  
146 Id.  
147 Id. at 579–80 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
148 Id. at 1156–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
149 Id.  
150 Id.  
151 Id. at 1158 “Many years ago the Ninth Circuit warned that a court should 
not ‘be blind to what must be necessarily known to every intelligent person.’” Id. 
(citing In re Wo Lee, 26 F. 471, 475 (1886)). 
152 Id.  
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demonstrate that the plaintiffs have received a concrete injury with the 
deprivation of their right to comment.153 
 
B. Post-Summers Application of the Standing Doctrine 
 
 Although Summers can be seen as a reaffirmation of Lujan, the 
federal circuits continue to apply the doctrine of standing haphazardly 
in environmental cases. What follows is a discussion of recent cases, 
which allow some plaintiffs to bring their cases and preclude others.  
 
1. Connecticut v. American Electric Power  
 
Eight states, a city, and three land trusts separately sued six of the 
largest energy companies and alleged that the defendants’ operations 
contributed to the public nuisance of global warming.154 The plaintiffs 
sought an abatement of the defendants’ ongoing operations of fossil 
fuel generation units, which were responsible for at least a portion of 
global warming emissions.155 According to the plaintiffs, these 
ongoing operations cause and will continue to cause serious harms 
affecting human health and natural resources.156 The defendants 
moved to dismiss the complaint, and the district court, agreeing, held 
that the plaintiffs’ complaint presented a non-justiciable political 
question.157 The court refused to address the standing issue because “it 
[wa]s so intertwined with the merits and required the court to address a 
political question.”158 On appeal, the defendants again argued that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing.159  
The Second Circuit reversed the lower court; it held first, that 
global warming does not present a non-justiciable political question, 
                                                 
153 Id.  
154 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. 582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009).  
155 Id.  
156 Id.  
157 Id.  
158 Id. at 332.  
159 Id.  
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and second, that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue these claims.160 
In examining the plaintiffs’ standing, the court stated, “[t]he Supreme 
Court has commented on the lowered bar for standing at the pleading 
stage, stating that general factual allegations of injury resulting from 
the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we 
presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are 
necessary to support the claim.”161 Further, under Second Circuit 
precedent, “at the pleading stage, standing allegations need not be 
crafted with precise detail, nor must the plaintiff prove his allegations 
of injury.”162 
First, the court addressed the ability of the states to bring the suit 
in parens patriae.163 Parens patriae is a common law doctrine where 
the sovereign state can sue to protect the interests of its citizens, “for 
the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.”164 
This allows a state to short cut the Lujan standing test.165 A state must 
have a quasi-sovereign interest to protect.166 Because of the damage to 
these states from global warming, and because the individuals 
involved could not seek individual redress, the states involved had 
standing parens patriae.167 
                                                 
160 Id.  
161 Id. at 333 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)) 
(internal quotations omitted).  
162 Id. (citing Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Buffalo v. Downtown Dev., 
Inc., 448 F.3d 138, 145 (2d Cir. 2006)).  
163 Id. at 334.  
164 Id. (citing Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890)). This doctrine is demonstrated in Georgia v. 
Tennessee Copper Co., where the State of Georgia sued to enjoin Tennessee Copper 
from emitting noxious fumes that would travel into the borders of Georgia. 206 U.S. 
230 (1907). Parens patriae standing is found when a state (1) has an interest apart 
from the interests of particular private parties, (2) expresses a quasi-sovereign 
interest, and (3) alleges injury to a substantial segment of its population. Alfred L. 
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 603 (1982).  
165 American Electric Power, 582 F.3d at 337.  
166 Id. at 338. 
167 Id. at 339. 
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Second, the court addressed whether all of the plaintiffs had 
proprietary (Lujan) standing.168 In this case, the plaintiffs clearly 
alleged harms resulting from climate change.169 For example, 
California alleged that it already was experiencing decreased mountain 
snowpack, which leads to declining water supplies available to the 
state’s residents. However, the bulk of the alleged harms were based 
on the future impacts of global warming.170 The defendants argued 
that the injuries were too speculative. The court, looking to 
Massachusetts v. EPA, held that the risk of global warming was re
and that the plaintiffs therefore had sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact




                                                
In addition, the court held that the plaintiffs satisfied the element 
of causation.172 The court stated that this element is “in large part 
designed to ensure that the injury complained of is not the result of the 
independent action of some third party not before the court.”173 In this 
case, plaintiffs sued the “five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the 
United States.”174 The defendants argued that the plaintiffs could not 
identify their individual portions of the harm, nor could the plaintiffs 
say that abatement of their individual emissions would prevent future 
harms caused by global warming.175 However, the court held that for 
standing purposes, the plaintiffs were not required to meet the same 
causation requirements as those of a nuisance claim in order to support 
their standing.176 In addition, the plaintiffs did not need to sue each 
and every polluter since the pollution of any one may be shown to 
 
168 Id..  
169 Id. at 341–42.  
170 Id. at 342. 
171 Id.  
172 Id. at 345.  
173 Id. (citing Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 
149, 161 (4th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotations omitted).  
174 Id.  
175 Id.  
176 Id. at 346.  
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cause some or part of the injury suffered.177 Therefore, the plaintiffs 
met their burden.178 According to the court, “they are not required to 
pinpoint which specific harms of the many injuries they assert are 
caused by particular Defendants, nor are they required to show that 
Defendants’ emissions alone caused their injuries.”179  
Finally, the court found that the injuries were redressable because 
any decrease in emissions would lessen the impact of global 
warming.180 
 
2. The Wilderness Society v. Kane County, Utah 
 
The Wilderness Society v. Kane County, Utah provides an example 
of a sufficient affidavit alleging aesthetic injury.181 In Wilderness 
Society, the plaintiff environmental organizations brought an action 
against the county government and claimed that a county ordinance, 
which opened preserved lands to the use of off-road vehicles, was 
preempted by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act.182 The 
district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, and the 
Tenth Circuit affirmed.183 
In this case, the plaintiffs were able to support their standing by 
alleging harms to their “health, recreational, scientific, spiritual, 
educational, aesthetic, and other interests.”184 One plaintiff stated 
specifically, “I have visited public lands in Kane County, and 
particularly lands within the Monument, at least four times per year for 
multiple days since 2003, and intend to return as often as possible, and 
                                                 
177 Id. at 347 (citing Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell 
Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990)).  
178 Id. 
179 Id.  
180 Id.  
181 581 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2009).  
182 Id. at 1208. 
183 Id.  
184 Id. at 1210. The other affidavits alleged similar uses and harms. Id. at 1211.  
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certainly within the next six months.”185 She actively “seek[s] out and 
prefer[s] to use those federal public land[s] that are more wild; in other 
words, those lands that are not burdened by [off-road vehicle] use.”186 
Finally, she stated that she was less likely to return to these impacted 
sites because of the disruptions caused by the off-road vehicles.187 
The Tenth Circuit held that these allegations were more than 
sufficient: the plaintiffs stated that they had visited the impacted sites; 
those sites would be negatively impacted by the allowance of off-road 
vehicles; and the plaintiffs intended to visit those sites again, but were 
less likely to do so because of the off-road vehicles.188 The dissent 
argued that there was no legally protected right at issue in this case.189 
However, according to the court, a plaintiff’s injury is judicially 
cognizable if it “is simply the sort of interest that courts think to be of 
sufficient moment to justify judicial intervention.”190 And, under Tenth 
Circuit precedent, injury to recreational and aesthetic interests is a 
sufficiently protectable interest.191 
 
3. Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne 
 
In Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, the plaintiff 
environmental organizations sued the Fish and Wildlife Service for 
promulgating regulations that allowed oil and gas companies to make 
non-lethal takings (incidental harassment) of polar bears and pacific 
                                                 
185 Id.  
186 Id.  
187 Id.  
188 Id. at 1210.  
189 Id.  
190 Id. (citing In re Special Grand Jury 89-2, 450 F.3d 1159, 1172 (10th Cir. 
2006)) (internal quotations omitted).  
191 Id. at 1212 (citing San Juan Cnty., Utah v. United States, 503 F.3d 1163 
(10th Cir. 2007)) In addition, the court cited a leading treatise: “[T]he phrase ‘legally 
protected interest’ provides ‘ample opportunity for mischief should a court be bent 
on denying the reality of a sufficient injury-in-fact.’” Id. (citing 13A CHARLES ALAN 
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walrus in the Beaufort Sea during their oil and gas exploration 
activities on the northern coast of Alaska.192 Similar to the allegations 
in Lujan and Summers, the plaintiffs alleged that these regulations 
violated the Marine Mammal Protection Act and the National 
Environmental Policy Act.193 The district court upheld the regulations 
and granted summary judgment to the Fish and Wildlife Service.194 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision, finding that the Fish and 
Wildlife Service did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in finding that 
the oil and gas activities would have a negligible impact on the 
affected endangered species.195 
Before reaching the merits of the case, the court first had to 
address a challenge to the plaintiffs’ standing to bring the case.196 
Following Summers, the court sought to determine whether any of the 
plaintiffs had “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy 
as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.”197 Although 
generalized harm to the environment is insufficient to confer standing, 
“[t]he interest that individuals have in observing a species or its 
habitat, ‘whether . . . motivated by esthetic enjoyment, an interest in 
professional research, or an economic interest in preservation of the 
species’ is sufficient to confer standing.”198 
In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that “they have viewed polar 
bears and walrus in the Beaufort Sea region, enjoy doing so, and have 
plans to return.”199 Moreover, if the plaintiffs’ allegations are proven 
true, the governmental regulations will create an imminent and 
                                                 
192 588 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2009).  
193 Id.  
194 Id.  
195 Id. at 711–12.  
196 Id. at 707. The Service raised the standing issue for the first time on appeal, 
after Summers was decided; however, challenges to standing can be raised at any 
time. Id. (citing United States v. Viltrakis,108 F.3d 1159, 1160 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
197 Id. (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S.Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009)) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
198 Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 582 (1992) 
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concrete harm to those interests by allowing others to harm those 
endangered species.200 “Unlike the alleged injury in Summers, this 
injury is geographically specific, is caused by the regulations at issue, 
and is imminent.”201 Overall, the plaintiffs were not simply 
challenging the regulations in the abstract.202 Unfortunately for the 
environmental plaintiffs, the regulations themselves were upheld by 
the court.203 
 
4. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA 
 
In Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, the class of environmental 
plaintiffs, a group of landowners with property located along the 
Mississippi Gulf coast, sued several energy, fossil fuel, and chemical 
companies, for the emission of greenhouse gases by the defendants 
that allegedly contributed to global warming.204 According to the 
plaintiffs, those emissions increased surface air and water 
temperatures, which in turn caused a rise in sea levels and added to the 
ferocity of Hurricane Katrina, all of which combined to destroy the 
plaintiffs’ private property, as well as public property used by 
members of the class.205 The class of plaintiffs alleged common law 
nuisance, trespass, negligence, unjust enrichment, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy.206 The defendants moved to 
dismiss these claims on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing 
and that the case presented non-justiciable political issues.207 The 




203 Id. at 712. 
204 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated for rehearing en banc, 598 F.3d 
208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed for lack of quorum, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 
2010). N.B. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal after the Spring 2010 semester 
had ended. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 859–60. 
207 Id. at 860. 
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district court granted this motion and dismissed the claims.208 The 
Fifth Circuit reversed with respect to the nuisance, trespass, and 
negligence claims; it held that the plaintiffs had standing and that the 
issue of global warming was not a political question.209  
In addressing the standing challenge, the court first noted that 
because this was a diversity case based on state common law claims, 
the plaintiffs must satisfy both state and federal standing 
requirements.210 However, Mississippi’s standing requirements are 
very liberal: “[a]ll courts shall be open; and every person for an injury 
done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy 
by due course of law, and right and justice shall be administered 
without sale, denial, or delay.”211 Therefore, the main focus was 
whether the plaintiffs had standing under federal law.212 
In determining standing, “[t]he claimant bears the burden of 
establishing standing, and ‘each element [of the three-part standing 
inquiry] must be supported in the same way as any other matter on 
which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and 
degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the 
litigation.”213 According to the Sixth Circuit, “[a]t the pleading stage, 
general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s 
conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presum[e] that 
general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to 
                                                 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 861 (“Where, as here, jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of 
citizenship, a plaintiff must have standing under both Article III of the Constitution 
and applicable state law in order to maintain a cause of action.” (citing Mid-Hudson 
Catskill Rural Migrant Ministry, Inc. v. Fine Host Corp., 418 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 
2005)). 
211 Id. (citing MISS. CONST. art. III, § 24); see also State v. Quitman Cnty., 807 
So. 2d 401, 405 (Miss. 2001) (“In Mississippi, parties have standing to sue ‘when 
they assert a colorable interest in the subject matter of the litigation or experience an 
adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant, or as otherwise provided by 
law.’”). 
212 Id. 
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support the claim.”214 In addition, the court differentiated between the 
standing inquiry for common law claims and injury to public rights.215 
In this case, the plaintiffs’ claims were based on common law theories 
of nuisance, and the defendants’ challenges were based on causation; 
this “essentially calls upon [the court] to evaluate the merits of 
plaintiffs’ causes of action,” which at the early stages of the litigation 
is “misplaced.”216 The absence of a valid cause of action is not a 
question of standing: “jurisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the 
possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on 
which petitioners could actually recover.”217 The court held that the 
plaintiffs, relying on scientific reports, had standing, and while they 
will be required to substantiate their assertions at a later time, at the 
pleading stage, at least, the court must accept their allegations as 
true.218 
 
5. Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil Corp. 
 
Villagers inhabiting a small arctic island sued many of the 
country’s largest emitters of greenhouse gases and alleged that these 
emissions contributed to global warming, which in turn caused a loss 
of sea ice on their island and exposed them to greater dangers.219 The 
sea ice protects the village from winter sea storms, and the erosion of 
the sea ice will force the village to relocate at a cost of 95 to 400 
million dollars.220 The Kivalina alleged causes of action in federal 
common law and state common law nuisance, civil conspiracy, and 
                                                 
214 Id. (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168 (1997)). 
215 Id. The court discusses various articles in coming to the conclusion that 
when a case presents a common-law tort claim, standing will be found. Id. at 862 
n.3. 
216 Id. at 864. 
217 Id. (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946)). 
218 Id. 
219 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009).  
220 Id.  
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concert of action.221 The defendants filed various motions to dismiss; 
they argued that the case presented a political question because there 
were no judicially discoverable standards upon which to adjudicate it 
case and that the plaintiffs lacked standing.222 The court agreed with 
the defendants and therefore, it dismissed the suit.223 
When a defendant challenges subject matter jurisdiction (i.e., 
standing), a plaintiff “must show in his pleading, affirmatively and 
distinctly, the existence of whatever is essential to federal jurisdiction, 
and if he does no do so, the court, on having the defect called to its 
attention or discovering the same, must dismiss the case, unless the 
defect be corrected by amendment.”224 In a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge, 
the court should “assume[] all factual allegations to be true and draw[] 
all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor.”225 However, if the 
moving party makes a “speaking” motion and submits materials 
outside of the pleadings, “it then becomes necessary for the party 
opposing the motion to satisfy its burden of establishing that the court, 
in fact, possesses subject matter jurisdiction.”226 The challenge in this 
case was facial only.227 
The crux of the standing issue in this case was that the plaintiffs 
were unable to trace their alleged injuries to any particular 
defendant.228 However, they argued that environmental plaintiffs suing 
under the Clean Water Act have standing where they show that each 
“defendant (1) discharged some pollutant in concentrations greater 
than allowed by its permit, (2) [the discharge was] into a waterway in 
which the plaintiffs have an interest that is or may be adversely 
                                                 
221 Id.  
222 Id.  
223 Id.  
224 Id. (citing Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th 
Cir. 2001)).  
225 Id. (citing Doe v. See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009) and Castaneda 
v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 684 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
226 Id. (citing Colwell v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 
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affected by the pollutant[,] and (3) that this pollutant causes or 
contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged by the plaintiffs.”229 The 
court, however, distinguished between violations of the Clean Water 
Act and the discharge of greenhouse gases, finding that contrary to the 
specific limits set for dischargers to water, there are no standards 
governing the amount of greenhouse gases that may be emitted.230 In 
addition, each defendant could point out several more emitters of 
greenhouse gases, which prevented the plaintiffs from demonstrating 
that the named defendants were the seed of their injury.231  
Additionally, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they fell 
within the “zone of discharge.”232 In order to satisfy the “fairly 
traceable” requirement for standing, the court must draw a distinction 
between “the plaintiffs who lie within the discharge zone of a polluter 
and those who are so far downstream that their injuries cannot fairly 
be traced to that defendant.”233 The court gives examples: an eighteen-
mile distance between the point of discharge and the area of plaintiff’s 
use of the body of water would be too much,234 and where the bodies 
of water used run hundreds of miles, discharges in those bodies are 
insufficient.235 In this case, the court found that everyone would fall 
within the relevant geographical zone, which would effectively 
                                                 
229 Id. (citing Pub. Interest Research Group v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 
913 F.2d 64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990)) (emphasis in original); but see Tex. Indep. Producers 
and Royalty Owners Ass’n v. E.P.A., 410 F.3d 964, 974 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
this presumption can be overcome if the defendant can point to another potential 
seed cause of the injury).  




233 Id. (citing Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn 
Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990)) (internal quotations omitted). 
234 Id. 
235 Id. (citing Tex. Indep. Producers and Royalty Owners Ass’n v. E.P.A., 410 
F.3d 964, 974 (5th Cir. 2005)). 
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eliminate the issue of geographic proximity, thereby allowing anyone 
to sue.236 
Finally, the court was not persuaded by the claims of “special 
solicitude” similar to Massachusetts v. EPA.237 Here, the plaintiffs 
were not challenging the actions of the United States government; they 
were simply seeking tort damages.238 Because they are not seeking to 
have the government enforce a right that they gave up to enter the 
union, they cannot pursue this case under the guise of the quasi-
sovereign “special solicitude.”239 
 




 In the nine-month period leading up to Pollack’s lawsuit, the 
United States Coast Guard discharged 62,584 bullets, consisting 
mostly of lead, into the Great Lakes.240 Lead has been listed as a toxic 
chemical under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act.241 It is a toxic metal that, even at low levels, may cause a 
range of health effects, including behavioral problems and learning 
disabilities.242 The health effects of lead are most severe for infants 
and children.243 For these receptors, exposure to high levels of lead in 
drinking water can result in delays in physical and mental 
development. 244 In adults, lead can cause kidney problems or high 





240 Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 08 C 320, 2008 WL 4286577, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2008). 
241 See 42 U.S.C. § 11002; 40 C.F.R. § 372.65; Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, No. 08 C 320, 2008 WL 4286577, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2008). 
242 Lead in Drinking Water, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
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blood pressure. 245 Although the main sources of exposure to lead are 
ingesting paint chips and inhaling dust, the EPA estimates that ten to 
twenty percent of human exposure to lead may come from lead in 
drinking water.246 
 
1. The Clean Water Act 
 
The original goals of the Clean Water Act (CWA) were to make 
all United States waters fishable and swimmable by 1983 and to 
eliminate the discharge of all pollutants into navigable waters by 
1985.247 In order to accomplish this objective, the CWA regulates 
several types of discharges. At issue in this case are point sources, 
which include “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance.”248 
A typical point source would be the discharge pipe from a factory. 
Point sources are regulated under the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES), which sets stringent limits on a 
facility’s right to discharge. A discharge of any pollutant in excess of 
the allotment in the facility’s NPDES permit is a violation of the 
CWA.249 If a facility does not have an NPDES permit, any discharge is 
illegal.250 
The CWA requires that the EPA enforce the terms of the NPDES 
permit.251 In addition, citizens may act as private attorneys general and 
sue a discharger who operates in violation of its permit.252 However, 
unlike the United States Attorney who may bring a suit on behalf of 
the Sovereign, a citizen must have interests and have been negatively 
impacted in order to have standing under the act.253 
                                                 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1)–(2) (2006).  
248 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
249 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). 
250 Id. 
251 33 U.S.C. § 1319. 




Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 5
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss2/5
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 5, Issue 2                         Spring 2010 
 
 
2. Rule 12(b)(1): A Civil Procedure Primer 
 
A motion to dismiss based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1) is a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, 
commonly in the form of an attack on the standing of the plaintiff.254 
Rule 12(b)(1) motions come in two forms: first, those that attack the 
sufficiency of the jurisdictional allegations, and second, those that 
attack the facts asserted as the basis for jurisdiction.255 Facial attacks 
are subject to the same familiar standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion: 
the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations and 
provide all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.256 By 
contrast, when the facts themselves are challenged, “the court is not 
bound to accept the truth of the allegations in the complaint.”257 The 
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction by 
competent proof.258 And the court may look to evidence beyond the 
face of the complaint.259 
 
B. The District Court Opinion 
 
Pollack’s first claims of injury relate to impacts to drinking 
water.260 However, the court reasoned that Pollack lives in Highland 
Park, thirteen miles south of the North Chicago water intakes.261 
Highland Park’s water supply comes from intakes different from North 
                                                 
254 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).  
255 Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 08 C 320, 2008 WL 4286577, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2008)  
256 Id. at *2 (citing United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 
942, 946 (7th Cir. 2002)).  
257 Id. (citing Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n, 149 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 1998)).  
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
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Chicago.262 In addition, Highland Park’s latest water quality sampling 
results showed that Highland Park had three sampling sites with lead 
in excess of fifteen parts per billion (“ppb”), the federal limit for 
drinking water, but the overall lead level in the city’s drinking water is 
below that level.263 
Pollack also contended that North Chicago’s drinking water has a 
higher concentration of lead, and given the dynamic nature of the lake, 
there is a real risk that lead from North Chicago will migrate to 
Highland Park.264 The court found that, even assuming that the 
plaintiff’s contention about the movement of water in the lake was 
accurate, both North Chicago and Highland Park would still have lead 
levels below the federal limit.265 
As an alternative injury, Pollack alleged that he experienced 
aesthetic injuries: (1) the enjoyment he gets from observing the 
migration of shorebirds and water fowl to and from the Great Lakes 
watershed is lessened by his concern that the lead munitions will harm 
the birds; (2) he is less likely to use the public areas along the Illinois 
portion of Lake Michigan because he fears that the lead munitions at 
Foss Park and the beach below the range will harm visitors to those 
areas; and (3) his desire to consume fish from waters of the United 
States is decreased because he fears that the fish are coming into 
contact with water contaminated by bullets from North Chicago 
range.266  
While the court agreed that there is “no question that injury to 
aesthetic interests, like enjoying wildlife and the natural environment, 
can be sufficient to confer standing,” Pollack had nonetheless failed to 
make a requisite showing of injury-in-fact.267 An injury-in-fact 
                                                 
262 Id. at *2 (citing CITY OF HIGHLAND PARK, 2008 DRINKING WATER 
QUALITY REPORT 1, http://www.ci.highland-
park.il.us/pdf/pw/waterQualityReport.pdf) (URL leads to the most recent water 
quality report)). 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at *3. 
265 Id. at *3. 
266 Id. at *4. 
267 Id. at *4. 
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requires more than an injury to a cognizable but abstract interest; it 
requires that the person seeking redress must be among those 
injured.268  
In evaluating his affidavit, the court focused on what Pollack did 
not say.269 Pollack did not say that he “(1) watches birds that feed at, 
nest on or routinely use the land or water near the range and his pursuit 
is being tarnished by fear that the bullets will harm the birds; (2) has 
stopped using the land near the range, or uses it less, because of his 
fears of contamination; or (3) has stopped consuming, or decreased his 
consumption of, Lake Michigan fish because he fears that the bullets 
have contaminated it.”270 The court held that Pollack’s claimed 
injuries were more of a generalized interest in the health of the Great
Lakes, not a specific harm that affected him in any personal w 271
 
ay.  
                                                
 
C. The Seventh Circuit Opinion 
 
1. Majority Opinion by Judge Manion 
 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Pollack’s claims.272 
Judge Manion, writing the opinion, found that Pollack failed to 
demonstrate injury-in-fact.273 The majority begins with a citation to 
the Supreme Court’s most recent standing decision, Summers v. Earth 
Island Institute.274 Judge Manion focused on limitations of judicial 
power and avoidance of infringement of the legislative and executive 
branches.275  
 
268 Id. at *4. 
269 Id. at *4. 
270 Id. at *4. 
271 Id. at *4. The other Blue Eco member’s affidavit was virtually identical to 
Pollack’s. Id. Therefore, because none of the members of Blue Eco had standing, 
Blue Eco cannot have standing. Id. 
272 Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 577 F.3d 736, 737 (7th Cir. 2009). 
273 Id. 
274 Id. at 739. 
275 Id.  
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The court first reviewed several precedents.276 First is Summers, 
where the Supreme Court held that the vague desire to return to an 
affected area was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
standing.277 The majority then discussed Sierra Club v. Franklin 
Power, which found standing for a plaintiff based on her likely 
exposure to pollutants coming from a plant that would be built.278 In 
addition, the court discussed Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper 
Recycling Corp., where the Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff had 
standing when he was located downstream of a facility that was 
violating its permit.279 
However, the court determined that Pollack’s exposure was not as 
likely as the plaintiffs in Franklin Power and Gaston Copper. 
Pollack’s distance is much farther than that of the plaintiff in Gaston 
Copper.280 In addition, according to the court, everybody knows that 
air pollution can spread the three miles in Franklin Power, but the 
same cannot be said for water pollution.281 Because Pollack can prove 
neither that he is downstream of the site of the discharges, nor that the 
lead will spread the thirteen miles, he lacks an injury in fact. 
Taken to the extreme, Pollack’s argument for standing would 
allow anyone on Lake Michigan, even those living 250 miles away, to 
sue.282 The majority also held that Pollack’s aesthetic injuries are too 
uncertain to provide standing.283 His desire to eat fish is similar to the 
allegations in Lujan and Summers in that he alleges merely a 
generalized injury.284 
                                                 
276 Id. at 739–40. 
277 Id. (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009)). 
278 Id. at 740 (citing Sierra Club v. Franklin Cnty. Power, 546 F.3d 918 (7th 
Cir. 2000)). 
279 Id. at 741(citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling 
Corp., 546 F.3d 918 (4th Cir. 2008). 
280 Id. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. at 742. 
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Pollack also failed to demonstrate that he has an actual aesthetic 
interest in the affected area because at the time of filing, Pollack had 
never been to Foss Park, nor did he have any plans to visit.285 
However, Pollack’s allegations stated that he enjoys the entire Illinois 
coastline, or on a larger scale, the Great Lakes watershed.286 For these 
reasons, Pollack’s interests were too generalized to grant standing.287 
“At bottom [the plaintiffs] appear to seek the simple satisfaction of 
seeing the [environmental] laws enforced.”288 
 
2. Concurrence by Judge Cudahy 
 
To Judge Cudahy, “[t]his is without question a close case.”289 In 
general, standing seems to “appear and disappear from one case to the 
next depending on subtle twists in the allegations, turning between the 
real and the hypothetical.”290 Judge Cudahy wrote separately to “make 
the point that the Supreme Court’s case law on [the] subject is both 
unclear in purpose and extraordinarily difficult to reconcile.”291 
Standing becomes a particular problem when a citizen-suit provision 
potentially sets the injury bar below what the Court requires to 
demonstrate standing.292  
The CWA provides that “any citizen may commence a civil action 
on his own behalf against any person . . . who is alleged to be in 
violation of an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter.”293 
The act also incorporates a citizen suit provision, granting standing to 
                                                 
285 Id. Subsequently, Pollack visited Foss Park; however, the Court held that a 
plaintiff cannot manufacture standing once the suit has commenced. Id. at 743 n.2. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. (citing Jaramillo v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 162 F.3d 675, 677 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998)). 




293 33 U.S.C. § 365(a)(1) (2006). 
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any “person or persons having an interest which is or may be 
adversely affected.”294 This provision has been interpreted to confer 
standing to the constitutional limit.295 
After reviewing the cases, Judge Cudahy stated: “These 
statements raise more questions than they answer. What is an ‘affected 
area’? How do we determine whether someone’s aesthetic or 
recreational values will be ‘lessened’ other than by their say-so? What 
counts as a ‘trifle’ sufficient to place someone ‘among the 
injured’?”296 “Is Highland Park, thirteen miles away, close enough to 
be ‘among the injured’?”297 
Judge Cudahy first probed the majority’s engagement of the 
relevant case law.298 He pointed out that Pollack’s facts are similar to 
those in Franklin Power, in that the court cannot determine, from the 
evidence before it, the extent of the impact of the contamination.299 
Further, he attacked the majority decision as a departure from its 
precedent in Franklin Power by implementing a narrower and more 
demanding requirement.300 
Judge Cudahy asserted that the Supreme Court in Laidlaw found 
that affidavits attesting to a reduced use of a natural resource out of a 
reasonable fear and concern were adequate to document an injury in 
fact.301 However, in this case, there is a factual challenge to Pollack’s 
standing.302 Because it is undisputed that the defendants regularly 
discharge lead into the lake, Judge Cudahy found that the narrower 
                                                 
294 33 U.S.C. § 365(g). 
295 Pollack, 577 F.3d at 743 (citing Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper 
Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 2000)). 




300 Id. at 745. 
301 Id. (citing Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 
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question is whether Pollack had a reasonable fear that his drinking 
water was unsafe.303  
Judge Cudahy then analyzed the majority’s fact-finding and came 
to the conclusion that the majority was simply incorrect in its 
assessment of the flow of the lake.304 Further, it served no purpose to 
take Pollack’s standing arguments to the extreme.305 
According to Judge Cudahy, the focus of this exercise should have 
been the evidence that the defendants presented to refute Pollack’s 
allegations.306 Judge Cudahy argued that the defendants proved that 
Highland Park draws its water from a discrete area of the lake different 
from the area presumably affected by the firing range.307 In addition, 
Highland Park attributes the lead in its own system to corrosive pipes, 
not water pollution.308 In this case, the defendants were able to 
demonstrate that the plaintiff’s fears were not “reasonable.”309 
Judge Cudahy agreed with the majority that Pollack’s affidavit did 
not give standing with regard to his aesthetic injury.310 Because 
Pollack did not allege that he uses the affected area, his affidavit 




Standing is used by judges to ensure that the parties have a reason 
to be in court. It is used to weed out the plaintiffs with too little at 
issue. In the environmental context, this often leaves the activist 
outside of the courthouse. At the same time, it prevents sham plaintiffs 
                                                 
303 Id. at 743. 
304 Id. at 745. 
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from entering a case that may allow a polluter to escape the full weight 
of its liabilities.  
 
A. Determining the Appropriate Standard of Review When the Facts 
Themselves are Challenged 
 
Standing challenges are generally seen through three lenses: 
facial, factual, and summary judgment. At one end, where the 
defendant brings a facial attack, the court must merely look at the 
allegations and determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the 
necessary elements to support its standing. This process is similar to 
the familiar Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. In this case, the court 
should assume that all of the allegations are true and take all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.312 Courts have even 
gone so far as to assume that a general allegation of harm will 
encompass a specific and concrete injury under this standard.313  
At the opposite end is Lujan, where standing was challenged by a 
motion for summary judgment.314 In this case, the Court demanded 
concrete evidence of a future injury.315 This standard was appropriate 
because the harms to the environment were a substantial distance from 
the plaintiffs’ homes, which made it reasonable for the Court to infer 
that the alleged harms to the plaintiffs would not actually occur 
because it was unlikely that the plaintiffs would make the trip again.316 
The Lujan approach results in a mini-trial by affidavit, which places 
the burden on the plaintiff to prove its evidence to the judge. It 
presents a higher hurdle for the plaintiff than the traditional summary 
judgment standard, where the plaintiff survives if it can show that a 
reasonable jury could find in its favor. Application of the Lujan 
                                                 
312 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 333 (2d Cir. 2009). 
313 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US. 555, 561 (1992); American 
Electric Power, 582 F.3d at 333; Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th 
Cir. 2009). 
314 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–64. 
315 See id. 
316 See id. at 579–80 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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standard has allowed courts to pre-litigate claims and act as fact-
finders, effectively removing the role of the jury from these cases. 
However, as argued by the dissent, this standard does not truly fit 
within the summary judgment framework.317 It is dangerous to apply, 
especially where the elements of standing are necessarily intertwined 
with the merits of the case, because it requires too much from the 
plaintiff by shifting the burden of proof before trial.  
Adding to the confusion is Laidlaw, where the court broadened 
standing by evaluating subjective harms. Laidlaw is laudable because 
it opens the courthouse to environmental plaintiffs and effectively 
gives meaning to the words that Congress provided in the citizen suit 
provisions of the CWA. The rule in Laidlaw is that plaintiffs will have 
standing if their reasonable fears of contamination adversely affect 
their use and enjoyment of nature.318 This provides an acceptable 
objective method of evaluation for alleged subjective harms. 
At the same time, Laidlaw demonstrates the problem with judicial 
fact-finding. Laidlaw remains a missed opportunity in this respect. In 
this case, the Court began with the factual proposition, found by the 
district court, that no measurable injury to the environment occurred as 
a result of the defendant’s violation of the CWA. This finding is in 
contrast with the will of Congress, which declared that any violation is 
an injury.319 The Court could have addressed this fundamental fact-
finding directly and held that any violation of the CWA is an injury 
because Congress says it is. It is Congress that has the power to define 
new injuries.320 However, the Court tiptoes around this finding of fact 
and instead finds standing based on a reasonable fear of 
contamination. 
The failure of the majority to address this issue was pointedly 
raised in dissent by Justice Scalia, who argued that if there is no harm, 
                                                 
317 See id. at 589–90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
318 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Serv. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 
167, 183–84 (2000). 
319 See id. at 174 (citing Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1365). 
320 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment). 
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there can be no foul.321 The problem with this argument, in this case, 
is that Congress legislated the harm and called the discharge of 
mercury in excess of a permit allowance a foul. It is not for a district 
court to find facts contrary to a lawful enactment of the legislative 
branch. However, Laidlaw remains the law and has led to much 
confusion, especially for Steven Pollack. 
                                                
The Court again addressed standing in Summers.322 This time, the 
Court required the plaintiff to allege specific facts in order to survive a 
motion to dismiss. In Summers, Justice Scalia found that because the 
amount of challenged timber sales was so small in relation to the total 
amount of preserved forest, the likelihood that a given timber sale 
would impact any of the plaintiffs was incredibly small. This approach 
is similar to the approach taken in Lujan, which demanded concrete 
plans to visit a project site. This represents a weak factual comparison 
by the Court. Justice Breyer, writing in dissent, argued that the 
probabilities actually favor the plaintiffs: based on the sheer number of 
member plaintiffs, it was very likely that at least one of the members 
will be impacted by a timber sale. This probability alone should have 
provided standing for the plaintiffs under the facts of this case. 
Justice Kennedy, again in concurrence, could have voted and 
decided this case. However, he explained that the burden-shifting was 
again appropriate because the injury, the right to comment on a given 
timber sale, was procedural in nature.323 Presumably, Justice Kennedy 
required a greater showing for a procedural injury because Congress 
has spoken on the causation and redressibility issues by lowering the 
bar on those prongs. However, he hinted at the possibility that the 
result would be different if the injury claimed was more than just a 






321 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 198–99. 
322 See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S.Ct. 1142 (2009). 
323 Id. at 1153 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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B. Application of the Standing Doctrine to Pollack v. United States 
 
By demanding specific facts, the Seventh Circuit applied an unfair 
standard to Steven Pollack’s affidavits.324 This burden-shifting 
standard is only appropriate where the likelihood of injury is small. 
The environmental injury in this case is not on the other side of the 
world. Pollack lives within thirteen miles of the alleged contamination. 
Compared to the plaintiffs in Lujan, Pollack merely has to hop into his 
car to be exposed. Under Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan, this 
level of burden-shifting is not appropriate when the proximity to the 
harm is that close.325 Nor is Pollack attempting to hit a moving target, 
like the plaintiffs in Summers. In fact, based on the proximity and 
certainty of the environmental harm, the burden should actually shift 
in the other direction, favoring Pollack.326 
Pollack is factually similar to Summers, in that the potentially 
affected area is very large, but the actually affected area is very small. 
In Summers, the national forests covered millions of acres, but the 
challenged timber sales accounted for a very small portion of the 
forest. Similarly, the Great Lakes are a vast expanse of fresh water, 
and the government’s actions impacted only a small portion of the 
lakes. However, the factual similarities end there. Summers is 
distinguishable because there, the possibility of harm was far from 
certain to happen, and it was even more difficult to pinpoint where it 
would happen if it did. By contrast, the government’s actions in 
Pollack had already happened in a discrete location, less than twenty 
minutes by car from Pollack’s home.327  
More importantly, Pollack’s alleged harms are not procedural in 
nature. Procedural injuries relate to information-gathering, such as the 
right to comment on a proposed agency action or the requirement that 
one agency consult with another to help it determine whether its 
                                                 
324 Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 577 F.3d 736, 742 (7th Cir. 2009). 
325 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579–80 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
326 Compare Lujan, 504 U.S. 555 with Pollack, 577 F.3d 736. 
327 Compare Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S.Ct. 1142 (2009) with 
Pollack, 577 F.3d 736. 
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actions will impact endangered species.328 Pollack has alleged that the 
federal government illegally dumped lead into Lake Michigan in 
violation of the CWA.329 Pollack has a statutory right to clean water 
under the CWA, and Congress has declared that any violation of the 
CWA is an injury. There is nothing procedural about it. And again, 
according to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, this time in Summers, 
burden-shifting is not the appropriate standard.330 
Under the facts of this case, Pollack alleged that he was exposed 
to elevated levels of lead, above the ambient levels of the lake, in his 
drinking water. This is a particularized injury, meeting the first part of 
the test.  
The problem with standing in this case is actually the issue of 
causation and redressibility.331 By citing the City of Highland Park’s 
water quality report, the government argued that it did not cause the 
increases in lead in Pollack’s drinking water. In response, Pollack 
failed to provide anything more than conclusory allegations to support 
his claims of causation. Further, because Pollack could not show that 
the removal of the lead source would decrease the amount of lead in 
his drinking water, his injury was not redressible. Pollack was unable 
to point to any question of fact with regard to this allegation. At a 
typical summary judgment hearing, the court would enter summary 
judgment for the government. Therefore, in this case, the dismissal of 
Pollack’s claims relating to drinking water impacts was appropriate, 
albeit under the wrong standard. 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit applies this unfair standard to 
Pollack’s aesthetic injuries. Although they are also not procedural 
injuries, the court again demanded concrete allegations, misapplying 
                                                 
328 Compare Summers, 129 S.Ct. 1142 (injury includes right to comment on 
timber sales) with Pollack, 577 F.3d 736 (injury includes exposure to a toxic 
chemical). 
329 Pollack, 577 F.3d at 741. 
330 See Summers, 129 S.Ct. at 579-80 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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Summers to allow it to read Pollack’s affidavit into absurdity.332 This 
approach is clearly at odds with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Center 
for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne.333 Factually, the cases are the 
same: a group of environmental plaintiffs challenge the actions of the 
government that affect a large body of water. Based on the early 
posture of the case, the court should assume all allegations to be true 
and give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences.334 More 
specifically, the court should assume that general allegations 
encompass more specific allegations.335 Pollack’s use of the Illinois 
portion of the coast of Lake Michigan would include Foss Park, not 
the entire seventy-plus-mile coastline. Pollack’s enjoyment in 
observing wildlife in the Great Lakes region would include those 
migratory birds who fly south in the winter and are exposed to lead 
before crossing Pollack’s path in Highland Park. And as for Pollack’s 
desire to eat freshwater fish, the court should have found that this 
necessarily includes Lake Michigan fish, including those exposed to 
lead. 
In fairness, it is not the court’s burden to produce appropriate 
affidavits. However, the court took the time to address what could 
have been alleged to prove his standing. Despite the fact that the 
district court entered its dismissal and the case was appealed and 
argued before Summers, the court did not give a second thought to 
applying Summers to this case. Pollack’s affidavits, which focused on 
his reasonable fears of impacts, were clearly tailored to the Court’s 
standard in Laidlaw. A better course of action would have been to 
remand and allow Pollack to resubmit his affidavit for conformance 
with Summers.  
                                                 
332 See Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 577 F.3d 736, 742 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(“Taken to its extreme, Pollack’s argument would permit any person living on or 
near Lake Michigan to assert that he has been harmed by the bullets, because the 
lead could potentially have been carried to every part of the lake.”). 
333 See 588 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2009). 
334 Id. at 711. 
335 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Connecticut 
v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 333 (2d Cir. 2009); Comer v. Murphy Oil 
USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009).  
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C. Use of State Courts as an Alternate Remedy 
 
For every wrong, there should be a right. This is a fundamental 
principal of many state constitutions.336 It is even truer in the case of 
environmental harms, where the fish and trees cannot march into court 
to protect their rights. Environmentalists may find friends in some 
state court systems. A litigant who lacks standing in federal court may 
find redress in the state court system by suing his or her own state. 
Massachusetts v. EPA has been widely read as finding a special right 
of the state to bring an action on behalf of its citizens.337 Under the 
right circumstances, an environmental plaintiff may be able to force 
the hand of his state. 
Notably, in Pollack, the court failed to consider whom Pollack 
sued. Pollack sued the President, who is both responsible for violating 
and enforcing the law. This case set up an interesting conflict of 
interest within the government; however, if the government is taking 
Pollack’s water, Pollack should be compensated.338 Takings problems 
are often brought to the courts. 
Therefore, one seeking to have environmental laws enforced can 
possibly muster standing by suing the state and alleging that the state 
failed to protect his interests. Then, whether by settlement or 
judgment, the state could be forced—by its own courts—to file an 
action against the polluter. Further, standing can be found under the 
state’s special solicitude. 
Additionally, extending this “special solicitude” to larger non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) may provide a better way to 
support standing. Many people join NGOs precisely because they feel 
that their government is failing to protect their environmental interests. 
                                                 
336 See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“Every person shall find a certain remedy 
in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, 
privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, 
and promptly.”). 
337 See, e.g., American Electric Power, 582 F.3d at 337-38. 
338 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“. . . nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”). 
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The commonality of interest among a diverse body of membership 
makes it more likely that the group as an entity will be impacted. 
Additionally, that commonality of interest may make many “non-
concrete” future plans more concrete. The probabilistic injury 
requirement is not as persuasive when applied to an individual or 
small group. However, with larger groups, there may be more 
members than certain states have citizens. In these cases, it is more 
probable that a member of Sierra Club will be impacted than a citizen 
of Vermont. 339 However, the state of Vermont would have standing, 
where the Sierra Club would not. At the very least, a suit on behalf of 
a large environmental group should swing the probabilities and not 
require concrete plans like in Lujan or Summers. 
 
D. Is Standing Still Relevant? 
 
Whether standing is still relevant seems to be a question that no 
one asks before reciting the rule from Lujan. Fundamentally, the 
standing doctrine has lost its purpose. Originally developed to prevent 
rogue courts from declaring acts of Congress unconstitutional, it is 
now more often used to frustrate the will of individuals attempting to 
enforce the acts of Congress. In general, the environmental plaintiff 
will sue because he feels that the executive, usually the EPA, has 
failed to enforce a given statute or regulation.340 He does not seek to 
invalidate an act of Congress itself. 
Standing is constitutional in nature, but it is not itself of the 
Constitution. It is common law and nothing more. Properly 
understood, standing is the judiciary interpreting its role under the 
Constitution. Congress is equally allowed to interpret the Constitution, 
and it has clearly done so by passing environmental statutes. Under 
these statutes, Congress has allowed citizens to enforce these 
provisions. Despite the clear intent of Congress to change the common 
                                                 
339 Compare the Sierra Club, with over 700,000 members (Summers v. Earth 
Island Inst., 129 S.Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009)), with Vermont, having 631,760 citizens, ( 
National and State Population Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2010). 
340 E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US. 555 (1992). 
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law where the environment is concerned, the courts continue to apply 
the same common law of standing to these new statutory rights. 
Additionally, science has improved and has been incorporated into 
the laws. We have a better understanding of the complexity and 
interconnectedness of our natural world than we had during the New 
Deal or even at the first Earth Day. We now understand how the 
aquatic systems interconnect and how greenhouse gas emissions can 
affect an entire planet. Despite all of this, courts have refused to 
recognize environmental nexus harms. 
Maybe it is time to retire standing as a hurdle in environmental 
cases. It served well in preventing a few activist judges from 
frustrating the will of Congress, but it has now outlived its usefulness. 
As applied, standing allows these same types of activist judges to 
override the careful deliberations of Congress by reasoning that a 
given plaintiff does not fall within a radius of injury. In many cases, 
standing is used to pre-litigate the fundamental elements of a case. The 
courts pay lip service to the requirements that the burden of proof for 
standing is not the same as for negligence causation or injury, but 
something lower. However, in many instances, the courts require a 
higher burden and shift it to the plaintiffs earlier in the litigation. 
In addition, all too often, standing is confused with the political 
question doctrine, with the court avoiding the appearance that it is 
interfering with the executive’s discretionary decision-making.341 
However, most traditional environmental cases no longer pose a 
political question. Congress has already spoken. Because Congress has 
spoken so clearly on the issue of environmental contamination of our 
nation’s air, water, and land, the political question doctrine is simply 
inapplicable to these cases. 
Finally, environmental settlements may be set aside if it can be 
shown that there was a lack of prosecution by the plaintiff.342 This 
prevents sham suits by requiring the defendant to ensure that there is a 
                                                 
341 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(greenhouse gases do not present a political question). 
342 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 
528 U.S. 167, 177 (2000). 
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real plaintiff. No longer must the court take this role. Therefore, 
without the historic considerations supporting the doctrine of standing 
in the environmental context, standing should be retired, as it is an 
impediment to environmental plaintiffs suing to protect our air, water, 




Despite an impressive catalogue of precedent, the application of 
standing remains haphazard. Moving forward, courts need to separate 
actual physical injuries from procedural injuries. The CWA provides a 
right to water free from unlawful discharges; NEPA, on the other hand, 
provides parties with the right to review and comment on proposed 
actions. Under Lujan and Summers, CWA violations should be subject 
to a different, less stringent standard. 
Second, standing is far from certain; however, courts need not 
engage the facts of the case to make appropriate decisions because 
aesthetic injuries provide a subjective injury. The plaintiff is the only 
party with knowledge of the areas that it has used in the past, as well 
as the areas that it intends to use in the future. The appropriate legal 
standard is whether a reasonable jury could find an injury. 
Third, if all else fails, an environmental plaintiff may seek a 
remedy at the state level. Many state constitutions profess to provide 
their citizens with a right to every wrong. Under the right set of 
circumstances, this may allow a plaintiff citizen to sue his government 
in order to force the state to protect its own environmental interests; in 
doing so, the plaintiff gains the state’s special solicitude to garner 
standing. 
Finally, although it remains highly contested, standing is no 
longer relevant in the context of traditional environmental claims. The 
doctrine, which was originally developed to protect Congress from the 
judiciary itself, has now been hijacked by the executive to avoid the 
will of Congress. Additionally, Congress, interpreting the Constitution 
for itself, has clearly spoken on most environmental issues. The courts 
should defer to Congress, instead of allowing outdated conventions of 
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common law to prevent the stated purposes of improving the 
environmental quality of this country. 
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